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Chapter 21 
Europeanization of National Parliaments 
Katrin Auel 
Introduction: The challenges of European integration  
 
‘Europeanization’ is a concept used to analyze a variety of changes within 
European Union and member states’ policies, politics and polities resulting from 
the process of European integration. Most often, the term is used to characterize 
‘domestic change and adaptation to pressures emanating directly or indirectly 
from EU membership’ (Featherstone 2003: 7; see also chapter 29 by Ladrech in 
this volume). Even more generally, one could define Europeanization as what 
happens ‘when something in national political systems is affected by something 
European’ (Vink 2003: 63). As these definitions imply, there are two sides to the 
process of Europeanization: Passive Europeanization describes the pressures 
emanating from European integration or, in other words, the impact of European 
integration on national policies, institutions or actors; active Europeanization, in 
contrast, refers to the domestic reaction to these changes.  
Scholars began to point out the pressures and challenges of European 
integration for national parliaments as early as the 1970s (e.g. Niblock 1971); 
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however, it was only in the 1990s, triggered by the difficult ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the famous ‘Maastricht decision’ by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 1993), that the growing debate over the 
democratic legitimacy of the European Union (or the lack thereof) focused the 
spotlight squarely on national parliaments. Notably, this debate concentrated 
primarily on the passive form of Europeanization, perceiving national parliaments 
as the objects (or, indeed, victims) of the integration process: For the most part, 
Europeanization was something that happened to them. Indeed, at that time, most 
scholars probably would have replied to a hypothetical Eurobarometer question 
that European integration was ‘a bad thing’ for national parliaments and for 
parliamentary legitimacy in general.  
Since then, much of the debate has centred on the question of whether or not 
European integration leads to the ‘de-parliamentarisation’ of politics (O’Brennan 
and Raunio 2007a).1 According to the ‘de-parliamentarisation’ thesis, European 
integration has weakened national parliaments in two ways. On the one hand, it 
had a direct impact on their legislative sovereignty by transferring legislative 
competencies to the EU level. Parliaments have lost agenda-setting power (since 
the right to initiate EU policies has been delegated to the European Commission 
and, increasingly, to the European Council) and policy-making competencies to 
EU institutions including the Council, the European Parliament, the Commission 
and a multitude of other actors. Parliaments have even lost the right to make the 
final decision on legislation, as EU law receives this final approval at the EU 
level. Depending on the type of legislation, national parliaments do retain the 
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possibility to amend or delay European legislation through the transposition of 
European directives, but member states are ultimately forced to comply. European 
law also has to be taken into account in domestic legislation, which may further 
restrain remaining national legislative powers. Scholars have attempted to 
measure the impact of European integration on the legislative competences of 
national parliaments, and despite all the methodological concerns associated with 
the quantification of Europeanization processes (Brouard et al. 2012; Töller 
2012), they have firmly consigned the prophecy made by Jacques Delors in the 
late 1980s – namely, that within ten years 80 per cent of domestic legislation in 
economic affairs would come from Brussels – to the realm of myth. However, this 
work has shown that a fairly large proportion of current domestic legislation has 
indeed been Europeanized, ranging from less than 8 per cent in the areas of 
defence, housing or social welfare to over 30 per cent in agriculture or 
environmental policy (based on data from 1987 to 2005; König and Mäder 2012: 
224). Depending on the operationalization of ‘Europeanization’ and ‘domestic 
law’, other authors have observed even a greater share of Europeanized legislation 
(for a discussion of various studies, see Töller 2012).  
On the other hand, European integration has also had a more indirect effect by 
altering the power balance between national parliaments and their governments. 
Since the latter are directly involved in policy-making at the EU level, executives 
can act as gatekeepers between the national political system and the EU level. As 
Moravcsik (1994) argues, this role gives them power over what he calls the ‘four 
I’s’: initiative, institutions, information and ideas. Governments can initiate 
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negotiations on policy issues without prior consultation, and they are able to 
dominate institutional decisions; their legislatures are later faced with ‘take-it-or-
leave-it’ choices because renegotiations are impossible. They can also manipulate 
ideological justifications for a particular policy, in part because they have access 
to a steady stream of information, a resource that parliaments can only obtain at 
considerable expense. What makes the situation even more difficult for national 
parliaments is the fact that each can control only its own government in the 
Council – but when exercising its legislative competencies, the Council acts as a 
collective actor. Thus, where the Council decides under unanimity, individual 
Council members can veto a decision, but they cannot enforce the adoption of a 
particular policy against the will of other members. Where the Council uses 
qualified majority voting (QMV), even the power to veto a policy is no longer 
given as Council members can potentially be outvoted. In such a case, national 
parliaments may be compelled to adopt policies that even their own governments 
did not agree to. 
European integration has thus had a strong impact on the role of national 
parliaments and domestic executive-legislative relations. However, institutions or 
actors rarely just accept a loss of power without any resistance, and this has held 
true for national parliaments. The debate over the democratic deficit of the 
European Union, and above all their interest in preserving their power have 
motivated parliaments to implement a range of institutional reforms designed to 
address the power shifts caused by European integration. The following section 
examines these institutional changes within national parliaments (active 
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Europeanization), while the third section discusses the use of scrutiny rights in 
practice, outlining incentives and constraints for parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs. The fourth section will then focus on more recent challenges and 
opportunities for national parliaments in EU politics: the new participation rights 
enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (in particular, the Early Warning System) and the 
impact of the ‘Eurozone crisis’. The final section concludes. 
 
‘Backbenchers learn to fight back’: Institutional Europeanization 
 
During the 1990s, a wave of studies (among many: Laursen and Pappas 1995; 
Norton 1996a) painted a rather dire picture of the decline of parliamentary power 
that seemed to confirm the idea that national parliaments had been ‘left behind in 
the rush’ (Norton 1996b: 192). As Weiler (1999: 266) summarizes, EU integration 
‘pervert[s] the balance between executive and legislative organs of government of 
the State. […] [N]ational parliamentary control, especially in large member states, 
[is] more an illusion than a reality.’ 
The gloom and doom of the early ‘de-parliamentarization’ debate is not really 
surprising. In fact, the early period of integration (from the 1950s to the late 
1980s/early 1990s) was characterized not only by parliamentary non-involvement 
but also by a general disregard for EU affairs on the part of most parliaments. 
Since then, however, national parliaments have learned ‘to fight back’ (Raunio 
and Hix 2000) and have implemented stronger scrutiny rights (for an analysis of 
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the development of parliamentary oversight institutions over time, see Winzen 
2012, 2013). These include the right to receive more comprehensive information 
on European issues from their governments. Second, national parliaments have 
professionalized by setting up European Affairs Committees (EACs) and by 
implementing procedures (formal or informal) to involve their specialized 
standing committees in the scrutiny process. Third, scrutiny procedures have been 
strengthened by establishing or extending the parliaments’ right to voice their 
positions on EU policies.  
Beyond these broad similarities, the institutional reforms – and their 
effectiveness – have been far from uniform across the EU Member States.2 
Effective scrutiny obviously depends to a large degree on the amount and quality 
of information that parliaments receive, and there are still significant differences 
with regard to parliamentary access to internal or confidential EU documents or to 
additional information from the government in the form of explanatory 
memoranda (COSAC 2012). In addition, we find discrepancies with respect to the 
parliamentary infrastructure established to manage and process this information. 
All national parliaments have set up European Affairs Committees, but there is 
variation in the number of committees involved in European affairs. Involvement 
of the standing committees (or the establishment of specialized sub-committees) 
has the advantage of increasing the number of MPs occupied with EU affairs; 
more importantly, scrutiny of EU policy will be informed by their specialized 
policy expertise. In some parliaments, the scrutiny of EU policies has therefore 
been formally delegated to the standing committees according to their policy 
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areas. In many parliaments, however, the EAC remains the main forum for 
dealing with European issues, and standing committees have at best an advisory 
role. 
 
In addition, we can also identify variation in the parliaments’ approach to 
scrutiny. Although the addressee of the scrutiny procedure is ultimately the 
government, systems differ in terms of whether the parliament scrutinizes EU 
documents, the government’s position for the negotiations in the Council or both. 
While some parliaments issue written statements, others communicate their 
position on European issues to the government orally during committee sessions; 
still others use both procedures. Most importantly, the consequences of such 
statements vary widely. In some cases, the government is legally – or strongly 
politically – bound to their parliament’s statement. This ‘mandating procedure’ 
means that the national representative must follow parliamentary instructions 
when negotiating a European policy in the Council of the EU. In many cases, 
however, these statements are merely the expression of the parliament’s opinion 
and have no binding effect. Finally, a number of parliaments have established so-
called ‘scrutiny reserves’ aimed at preventing government representatives from 
agreeing to a proposal in the Council while the parliamentary scrutiny process is 
still underway. 
 
 Table 21.1: scrutiny provisions in national parliaments JUST ABOUT 
HERE 
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A number of studies have classified and ranked national parliaments according to 
their institutional strength in EU affairs. Although these rankings differ slightly 
due to varying emphasis on specific institutional provisions, the overall picture is 
fairly consistent. As recent rankings by Karlas (2012), Winzen (2012) and Auel et 
al. (2014) show (see Table 21.1), we can identify a group of strong, mainly North 
European, parliaments, including those of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, but also 
Germany and the Netherlands. These parliaments generally have broad access to 
information, fairly strong mandating rights and, with the exception of Denmark, 
systematically involve their standing committees in the scrutiny process. In 
contrast, relatively weak parliaments can be found primarily in Southern member 
states, such as Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain, but also in Belgium, Ireland 
and Luxemburg. Austria, France, Italy, Malta and the UK fall somewhere in 
between these two extremes. The new Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
member states have faced specific challenges related to their adaptation to both 
democratization and accession to the EU. At first, accession negotiations in 
combination with the obligation to implement the complete European acquis 
communitaire resulted in a serious net increase in power for national executives 
vis-à-vis other domestic actors, especially parliaments (Dimitrova and 
Mastenbroek 2006; Goetz 2005; Raunio and O’Brennan 2007b). As Sadurski has 
argued, executive control over the accession process was almost complete, but 
this was ‘perhaps no bad thing, given the notorious inefficiency and incompetence 
of parliamentary institutions in post-communist states, and […] arguably the only 
way to ensure that the enormous body of EU law was transposed into domestic 
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legislation’ (Sadurski 2006: 7). However, the new constitutions of these countries 
tend to grant a more significant role to legislatures than most of the recent 
Western European constitutions (Malovà and Haughton 2002), and many of their 
parliaments can – at least with respect to their formal institutional position – be 
considered relatively strong.  
 
Table 21.2 Institutional Europeanization: Ranking national parliaments 
according to their institutional strength in EU affairs just about here  
 
 
 
How can we explain these differences? One rather straightforward explanation is 
that parliamentary power in EU matters mirrors parliamentary strength in 
domestic matters, since parliamentary scrutiny procedures are intended to re-
establish the executive-legislative power balance affected by European 
integration. As Raunio notes, ‘Indeed, research on explaining cross-national 
variation in the level of scrutiny in EU matters indicates that the overall strength 
of the legislature “spills over” to European affairs, with stronger control of the 
government in domestic matters producing also tighter cabinet scrutiny in 
European affairs’ and vice versa (Raunio 2009: 330, footnote 11). The degree of 
public support for the EU in the member state and the existence of anti-European 
parties (Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005) also seem to be important factors. In 
addition, member states that joined the EU later tend to have tighter scrutiny 
procedures than the earlier members, which can be explained by the fact that the 
salience of EU affairs has risen over time due to the increasingly important role of 
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the EU and its growing impact on the member states (Winzen 2013). Moreover, 
parliaments have also learned from one another. For example, the Finnish and 
Swedish parliaments borrowed many elements of the Danish scrutiny system 
when devising their own procedures; we can also see this institutional learning in 
the parliaments of the new member states, particularly with regard to their close 
inter-parliamentary cooperation and the use of ‘old’ member states as role models 
for the development of scrutiny procedures (O’Brennan and Raunio 2007b).(see 
Table 21.2.)  
 
‘Are they really fighting back?’ The Europeanization of parliamentary 
behaviour 
 
The institutional Europeanization of national parliaments is by now well 
documented in the literature. However, formal institutional provisions tell only 
part of the story; to obtain a complete picture of the Europeanization of national 
parliaments, we also need to take the adaptation of parliamentary behaviour into 
account. Parliamentary institutions are crucial because they provide formal 
constraints and opportunities for parliamentary activity. However, institutional 
opportunities remain latent until they are utilized used. To what extent do MPs 
actually get involved in the scrutiny of EU affairs? Do they take advantage of 
their control rights and parliamentary instruments of influence?  
There is still much unknown about actual parliamentary behaviour in EU 
affairs. However, existing studies suggest that parliaments differ with regard to 
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their formal institutional scrutiny provisions as well as in terms of their level of 
activity in EU affairs. A recent study provides, for the first time, comparative 
empirical data on parliamentary activities, namely parliamentary statements 
(resolutions and mandates), plenary debates on EU issues, EAC meetings, 
hearings with the Prime Minister and opinions issued in the context of the Early 
Warning System and the Political Dialogue (see below) between 2010 and 2012 
(Auel et al. 2014). As the study shows, the powerful parliaments of Denmark, 
Finland, Germany and Sweden are also the most active, followed by the Austrian, 
Dutch, Estonian, Italian and Lithuanian parliaments. The Portuguese parliament is 
also in this group of active institutions, although the Assembleia focuses primarily 
on sending opinions within the Political Dialogue. Among the least active are the 
parliaments of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary and Malta. 
The parliaments of Belgium, France, Ireland, Latvia, Luxemburg, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the UK form a large intermediate group. 
These findings indicate that despite their initially weaker position vis-à-vis their 
executives during and after the accession process, a number of the new CEE 
parliaments have now become very active in EU affairs. (Textbox 21.1.) 
 
Textbox 21.1: Parliaments in action: Scrutiny in Finland and France  
Scrutiny in the Finnish Eduskunta: In the Eduskunta, the Grand Committee, 
which coordinates parliamentary scrutiny of EU policies, and the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, which deals with EU foreign and security policy matters and Treaty 
amendments, are the two main committees responsible for EU policies. The 
government must inform the Eduskunta without delay of proposals for Council 
decisions and other EU matters, usually through a letter outlining the content of a 
European document and the government’s position on it. Although the Grand 
924 
 
Committee is the main parliamentary actor in EU affairs and is responsible for 
mandating the government, the standing committees are systematically involved: 
The Speaker of the Eduskunta requests one or (usually) more standing 
committee(s) to submit their opinion on the issue to the Grand Committee. The 
Grand Committee then debates the matter and formulates a parliamentary 
recommendation, which is forwarded to the government without any involvement 
of the plenary. To allow the Eduskunta to monitor and guide the negotiation 
behaviour of the government as early in the process as possible, the Grand 
Committee seeks to formulate its view before the consideration of the matter 
begins in the preparatory bodies of the Council. Although the recommendations 
and opinions of the Committee are not constitutionally binding, they are 
considered to be politically binding for the government, which must justify all 
deviations from the parliamentary opinion ex post. In comparative studies of 
parliamentary EU scrutiny mechanisms, the Eduskunta is unfailingly categorized 
as one of the strongest and most active parliaments in EU affairs, and several 
national parliaments (for example, the parliaments of the Baltic countries, 
Hungary and Slovenia) have adopted features of the Finnish scrutiny model.  
Scrutiny in the French Assemblée Nationale: The main committee dealing 
with EU affairs in the Assemblée Nationale is the Commission des affaires 
européennes; however, this commission remains subordinate to the standing 
committees in this role. European documents are first sent to the EAC, which can 
designate one or more rapporteurs to draw up a detailed report (rapport). The 
outcome can be the tabling of a resolution proposal, but the report may also 
remain informative in character (rapport d’information), including the mere 
expression of conclusions on the document. Conclusions only express the view of 
the Commission; formal resolutions, in contrast, require the involvement of one of 
the standing committees. In addition, the EAC shares with individual MPs the 
right to table motions for resolutions. The responsible standing committee 
appoints its own rapporteur and takes a position on the Commission’s resolution 
proposal, which it can adopt ‘as is’ (and often does), amend or reject. Finally, 
following the distribution of the standing committee report, the motion for a 
resolution can be placed on the agenda of the plenary upon the request of a party 
group, committee chair or the government. If no request for a plenary debate is 
made, the text adopted by the standing committee is considered final and is 
transmitted to the government. Resolutions, however, are explicitly non-binding 
and have less of a politically binding effect as well. Long considered a rather 
weak parliament in EU affairs, today the Assemblée Nationale plays a more active 
role and is situated midfield in most rankings.   
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The data does, of course, not provide a comprehensive overview of 
parliamentary activities in EU affairs. For example, it does not measure the use of 
other parliamentary control instruments (such as parliamentary questions) or 
capture time spent on EU affairs in parliamentary party group meetings. It also 
tells us little about the impact of parliamentary activity, i.e. whether more active 
parliaments actually wield greater control over their governments and more 
influence over EU policy-making. However, it does offer a first comparative 
impression of the Europeanization of parliamentary behaviour. It also illustrates 
the large variation in the level of activity in EU affairs as well as the fact that 
institutional strength does not always translate into active parliamentary 
involvement, and vice versa.  
Rational explanations for legislative behaviour in EU affairs have pointed out 
that parliaments are in fact rather busy institutions. Parties and MPs have only 
limited time resources and thus have to consider the costs and benefits of 
spending time and energy on the scrutiny of EU affairs. Costs associated with 
scrutiny are fairly straightforward: They relate to the resources that need to be 
invested in oversight activities, such as time, the costs of information gathering 
and opportunity costs of not investing resources in other activities. But what are 
the incentives for scrutiny in EU affairs?  
First, it can be argued that MPs need electoral incentives to invest limited 
resources in the scrutiny of European affairs (Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005). In 
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member states in which EU issues are more salient and public opinion is generally 
more critical of EU integration, MPs have a greater incentive to become active in 
EU affairs due to the potential electoral impact of EU politics. In contrast, in 
countries where European affairs play no role in voting decisions or where the 
permissive consensus prevails, there are no electoral benefits to be gained from 
investing in scrutiny. This argument has been used to explain the relative 
weakness of the parliaments in the Southern European member states Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. Until just recently, these countries were among the member 
states with the most consistently Europhile public (and elite), which resulted in an 
uncritical perception of the European integration process and thus undermined 
effective parliamentary scrutiny in EU matters (Magone 2007). However, since 
the ‘Eurozone crisis’ (see below), EU affairs have certainly become much more 
salient in these member states and throughout the EU in general.  
Second, MPs will get involved in the scrutiny of EU affairs if they expect a 
payoff in terms of policy influence (Saalfeld 2005; Winzen 2013). Generally 
speaking, governing party groups will be more inclined to leave EU politics to 
their government if they trust it to represent their mutual policy preferences in EU 
negotiations. This trust can be assumed to be greatest in the case of single-party 
governments. Although government MPs and ministers might not agree on every 
single issue, we can expect their interests to be fairly similar – unless the party is 
deeply internally divided over EU issues. Divergent preferences and thus less trust 
can be expected in the case of coalition governments. Here, coalition partners not 
only have to negotiate compromises, but they also have a stronger incentive to 
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attempt to influence and control the other coalition partners’ members of 
government. Trust would thus be lowest in minority governments, explaining why 
the Scandinavian parliaments are especially powerful and active in EU affairs. 
Sweden and Denmark frequently have minority governments;3 these governments 
cannot rely on the trust and support of a loyal majority in parliament but instead 
have to negotiate policies with at least part of the parliamentary opposition. Even 
without a formal mandating procedure, minority governments have to ensure that 
the policies agreed to at the European level can actually be implemented at the 
national level.  
In addition, Auel and Benz (2005) argue that EU politics pose a dilemma for 
actors in a parliamentary system, in particular for governing parties. For national 
MPs, challenge lies not only in deciding whether they want to invest limited 
resources in scrutiny processes, but also in balancing conflicting incentives. If 
they publicly bind or control their ministers in the Council, governing 
parliamentary party groups run the risk of undermining the trust between the 
government and its backbenchers. In addition, there is the danger of damaging the 
bargaining power of the government in Council negotiations by reducing its room 
for manoeuvre. However, if they renounce control of their government in 
European policy-making, they abdicate power in the national arena. Neither is in 
the interest of the governing party groups. As a result, MPs do not always make 
full use of their institutional rights; but also develop more informal strategies to 
avoid this dilemma. These strategies include, for example, the close cooperation 
with the government behind closed doors (in-camera committee sessions or 
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private parliamentary party group meetings) and attempts to exert influence 
directly at the European level or to hold the government publicly to account. 
However, whether MPs use their formal competencies or more informal 
strategies, purely rational explanations cannot always account for what would 
have to be considered ‘irrational’ behaviour: In many parliaments, MPs spend 
several hours per week scrutinizing EU documents, presenting parliamentary 
reports and drafting resolutions, even though they know that their activities will 
attract little attention from voters (or frontbenchers, for that matter) and will have 
very limited impact on policy. Rozenberg therefore argues, on the basis of a 
comparison of the EAC Chairs in France and Britain since the late 1970s, that 
emotional incentives and role perceptions also have an impact on the extent and 
direction of their involvement in EU affairs (Rozenberg 2012). MPs are thus not 
simply vote- or policy-seekers. Whether and in what ways they involve 
themselves in EU affairs also depends on how ‘their favourite parliamentary role 
adapts itself to this new position because emotional gratifications proper to this 
role can be developed through the involvement in EU affairs’ (ibid.: 13).  
 
New challenges and opportunities 
 
Over the last few years, two developments have had an enormous impact on the 
role and position of national parliaments in EU politics. One is the coming into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. Often hailed as the Treaty of 
Parliaments, it not only strengthened the position of national parliaments within 
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the domestic arena, primarily by giving them direct access to European 
documents, but also, for the first time, provided them with direct input in the 
legislative process at the European level. At the same time, however, parliaments 
also face new challenges due to the Eurozone crisis and the European counter-
measures, which increasingly subject budgetary authority – a key prerogative of 
parliaments – to influence from EU institutions both within and outside of the EU 
Treaty framework. The following section will discuss these new developments in 
turn.  
 
Becoming subsidiarity watchdogs: The Lisbon Treaty 
Although earlier Treaty revisions had recognized the role national parliaments 
play in providing democratic legitimacy for European policy-making, the Lisbon 
Treaty represents a new departure in this respect. Not only does the Treaty grant 
national parliaments direct access to the Treaty amendment process through the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, but it also explicitly mentions national 
parliaments and areas of their involvement for the first time (Article 12 TEU).4 
This role is then further outlined in two protocols annexed to the Treaty. 
According to the first, the ‘Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union’, national parliaments are to receive all draft European legislative 
acts directly (rather than via their governments); in addition, they will receive a 
broader range of non-legislative documents, such as the annual reports of the 
Court of Auditors and the Commission’s annual legislative programme. The 
second, the ‘Protocol on The Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity’, 
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outlines the provisions for the control of the subsidiarity principle by national 
parliaments, the so-called Early Warning System (EWS, see Textbox 21.2). As 
the name implies, the ESW provides for ex-ante subsidiarity checks, but the 
Treaty also opens up the opportunity for ex-post control: According to Article 8 of 
the Protocol, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will have 
jurisdiction in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity 
by a legislative act, and such action can now also be brought before the Court by 
national parliaments through their governments.  
 
Textbox 21.2: The Early Warning System 
 According to Article 7.1 of the ‘Protocol on The Application of the Principles 
of Subsidiarity’ attached to the Treaty of Lisbon, national parliaments have the 
right to submit, within eight weeks, a ‘reasoned opinion’ to the Commission if 
they consider a legislative draft act to violate the subsidiarity principle (Article 
7.1). These opinions are akin to votes, and each member state has two votes – one 
for each chamber in bicameral parliaments and two for unicameral parliaments. If 
national parliaments representing one-third of the votes (18 out of 54 votes) 
submit a reasoned opinion, the Commission must formally review the proposal; it 
may withdraw or amend the proposal, but can also maintain it unaltered (Article 
7.2). In these cases, national parliaments show the Commission the ‘yellow card’, 
but they cannot force it to take their concerns into account. If, however, national 
parliaments representing at least half of the votes submit reasoned opinions on a 
legislative proposal falling under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision), 
and the Commission maintains the proposal, the legislative proposal will be 
submitted to both the Council and the European Parliament for review (‘orange 
card’). If either body decides with a majority of 55 per cent that the proposal is 
incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity, the ‘legislative proposal shall be 
given no further consideration’ (Article 7.3b).  
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Yet to what extent has the EWS truly strengthened national parliaments in EU 
affairs? On the plus side, the new provisions enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, 
especially the requirement that the subsidiarity check be conducted within eight 
weeks, have led to a general overhaul of parliamentary scrutiny procedures in a 
number of national parliaments. Parliaments now receive better information, not 
just through the direct transmission of EU documents, but also increasingly 
through explanatory memoranda from their own governments that outline the 
content and importance of the government’s stance on EU bills. In addition, the 
EWS encourages a more systematic and timelier scrutiny of EU documents.  
 
However, there are also grounds for scepticism. First of all, the subsidiarity check 
is merely a ‘negative’ right with a rather narrow remit. Thus, it does not give 
national parliaments the right to reject a proposal for reasons related to the policy 
content, nor does it provide them with the opportunity for more constructive 
input. Second, the right can only be used collectively. Thus far (November 2013), 
the quorum for a ‘yellow card’ has been reached twice, with regard to the 
proposal for the so-called ‘Monti II’ Regulation and for a regulation on the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office.5 In the case of the 
Monti II regulation, the Commission subsequently withdrew the proposal, but 
stated that this was not due to parliamentary concerns, since a breach of the 
subsidiarity principle was not evident in the opinions. Rather, the Commission 
explained, the proposal was withdrawn because it was ‘unlikely that to gather the 
necessary political support within the European Parliament and the Council’.6 
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Given that the Commission might not have withdrawn the proposal without 
parliamentary intervention, a certain success on the part of the parliaments cannot 
be denied. But the example also suggests that the success of the EWS will depend 
to a large degree on whether or not the national government support the legislative 
proposal. However, if the ‘government foresees problems with the legislative 
proposal, what then does a parliamentary reasoned opinion add to a critical voice 
or “no” vote by the government in the Council?’ (De Wilde 2012: 9) With regard 
to the proposal concerning the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the 
Commission has already indicated that it will maintain the proposal despite the 
yellow card (European Commission 2013d).  
 
Against this background, another potentially positive effect of the new 
procedures, namely the establishment of a closer dialogue between national 
parliaments and the Commission, must be viewed with some scepticism. Since 
2006, as part of the ‘Political Dialogue’, the Commission sends all legislative 
proposals and consultation documents directly to national parliaments, inviting 
them to express their opinions on these documents without any restriction to 
issues of subsidiarity. In turn, the Commission has promised not only to reply to 
all opinions, but also to take them under due consideration (Preising 2011: 152). 
National parliaments have made varying but overall active use of this opportunity. 
Thus far, however, the political dialogue does not seem to have had any 
discernible impact. Not even the Commission points to a single instance in its 
annual reports7 in which it actually took parliamentary concerns into account and 
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amended a proposal accordingly. Given the variety of concerns and suggestions 
expressed in the national opinions, it is also unclear exactly how the Commission 
is supposed to do that exactly. As long as national parliaments fail to coordinate 
their positions more closely, the Commission will probably continue to send its 
polite - but inconsequential - thank-you notes.8  
 
National parliaments and the Eurozone crisis9 
 
Although the global crisis began much earlier,10 it fully hit the EU in early 2010 
with the advent of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Since then, it has spread to 
other member states, most notably Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Cyprus, and 
EU member states have agreed on a number of economic governance reforms to 
manage and overcome what is now a ‘Eurozone crisis’(for an overview, see 
Kunstein and Wessels 2012). These reforms include the initial European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF, in force since June 2010) and the permanent European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM, in force since October 2012), special-purpose 
vehicles established to provide aid to Eurozone member states in need of financial 
assistance. Other measures are targeted at reforming the Stability and Growth Pact 
and improving the coordination of economic governance within the EU to prevent 
future crises; among these are the so-called ‘six pack’ (including the ‘European 
Semester’11), the ‘two pack’ and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG, commonly known as 
the ‘Fiscal Compact’), which requires member states to achieve a surplus or at 
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least a balanced budget, to establish constitutional or statutory mechanisms to 
limit public borrowing and to accept sanctions in case of non-compliance.  
 
The crisis has impacted national parliaments in a number of ways. First and 
foremost, parliaments in financially threatened member states have lost some of 
their freedom of action due to the dire financial situation; they must also comply 
with rather strict obligations, laid out in the Memoranda of Understanding, to 
consolidate their budgets as a precondition for receiving financial assistance from 
the EFSF and ESM. This places a heavy burden on their citizens in terms of 
unemployment, salary and pension cuts and the retrenchment of social welfare 
programmes. The donor countries, in contrast, have to shoulder large financial 
guarantees, which may severely limit their own future room for manoeuvre. In 
addition, instruments such as the European Semester and the Fiscal Compact 
greatly impact fiscal and economic policy for the parliaments of all (participating) 
member states.  
 
Second, some of the measures have been implemented within the legal framework 
of the EU Treaties and thus apply to all member states; these include the ‘six-
pack’ and the European Semester. However, other important measures, such as 
the EFSF and ESM (Eurozone members only) and the Fiscal Compact (signed by 
all EU member states except the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom), are 
based on intergovernmental agreements or Treaties outside of the EU legal 
framework (Kunstein and Wessels 2012). As a result, national governments have 
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treated (or have tried to treat, see below) the latter as foreign rather than EU 
policy, which limits the involvement of national parliaments.  
 
Closely related is a third development: the dramatic strengthening of European 
executives. With the EU in full crisis mode, the European Council has become the 
most important forum for decision-making in EMU affairs. The Eurozone 
member states have also set up their own decision-making body, the Euro Area 
Summit. The transfer of decision-making powers to these bodies has transformed 
them into something like a European economic government (Wessels and 
Rozenberg 2013). In fact, the financial crisis provides a perfect illustration of 
Moravcsik’s argument concerning the executive’s gatekeeper role: Not only do 
governments initiate crisis-related policies and control their institutional design, 
but they can also manipulate ideological justifications. As Puntscher Riekmann 
and Wydra assert, ‘National governments defend policies agreed on at the 
European level and present national parliaments with a fait accompli. […] This 
becomes particularly clear in their discourse on the rescuing of the Eurozone and 
of the single currency as the European common good, whereas national 
parliaments’ representation claims are thwarted as particularistic and parochial’ 
(Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013: 570). In a similar vein, some of the 
measures have strengthened the European Commission considerably. This is 
especially true of the European Semester, which empowers the Commission to 
define general EU-wide policy goals that member states must follow; the 
Commission now also evaluates and makes specific recommendations regarding 
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national reform programmes, thus interfering in areas of genuine parliamentary 
authority (Hallerberg et al. 2012). However, both general and member state-
specific recommendations have to be approved by the European Council and the 
Council, thus providing national parliaments with potential influence via their 
governments.  
 
As was the case with EU politics in general, parliaments have also responded to 
the developments outlined above. However, parliamentary participation rights – 
for example, in relation to ex-ante and ex-post scrutiny of EU Councils and Euro 
Area Summits (Wessels and Rozenberg 2013) and new instruments such as the 
EFSF or ESM – vary considerably; some parliaments enjoy extensive oversight 
and veto rights for decisions at the European level, while others have mere 
informational rights or almost no involvement in the process at all (Deutsche 
Bank Research 2011). Powerful parliaments include the ‘usual suspects’ among 
the Eurozone members, such as the Scandinavian parliaments and the parliaments 
of Germany, Austria, Estonia and the Netherlands. In Germany, the Bundestag 
has been significantly strengthened due to decisions issued by the German 
Constitutional Court (for details, see Höing 2013); for example, the Court has 
ruled that crisis measures outside of the EU legal framework are essentially 
European policies and that the Bundestag must therefore be involved accordingly. 
It also obliged the government to obtain the prior approval of the Bundestag or its 
budget committee before agreeing to any financial guarantees or to the release of 
bailout funds. The Austrian parliament, in contrast, used the ratification of the 
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Article 136 TFEU amendment12 to secure more extensive parliamentary 
codecision rights, obliging the government to obtain a prior mandate from 
parliament before agreeing to ESM-related measures. In addition, a new 
permanent sub-committee of the budget committee now monitors the 
government’s ESM-related activities (Konrath 2012). However, this strengthening 
of some parliaments has also had a paradoxical inter-parliamentary impact, as the 
oversight rights of donors’ parliaments may clash with the sovereignty of the 
recipients’ parliaments. One of the conditions for financial assistance is that 
debtor countries make their economic programmes and budget plans available for 
review by the other member states – and, in some cases, their parliaments. It 
famously ‘came as a shock to many members of the Irish Daíl to discover in 
November 2011 that their government’s draft budget plans for the next financial 
year, including a new proposal to raise value added tax by 2 per cent, had been 
seen by members of the Bundestag before it had been made available to them’ 
(Fox 2012: 465–6).  
 
Overall, the crisis has thus has a complex impact on national parliaments. On the 
one hand, the reforms do impact core areas of parliamentary authority to an 
unprecedented degree. On the other hand, some national parliaments have been 
able to assert their power, while others have been side-lined. Not only has the 
crisis affected Eurozone and non-Eurozone parliaments as well as donor and 
debtor parliaments differently, but it has also weakened precisely those 
parliaments that are generally weaker in EU affairs (see also Auel and Höing 
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2013). As a result, the crisis has firmly cemented the gap between stronger and 
weaker parliaments. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Despite the broad literature on national parliaments and the EU, our understanding 
of the Europeanization of national parliaments remains limited. While the 
institutional Europeanization of national parliaments is by now well documented 
in the literature, we still know too little about the role parliaments actually play in 
EU affairs. More research is needed on the Europeanization of parliamentary 
behaviour and on the actual impact and effectiveness of parliamentary 
involvement in EU politics, i.e. the extent to which national parliaments are 
indeed capable of controlling their governments in EU affairs and influencing EU 
policy. As a result, there is also still much disagreement over whether national 
parliaments have become more powerful and effective scrutinizers or remain 
essentially marginalized in EU politics.  
 
However, analyzing parliamentary Europeanization also poses more fundamental 
challenges, mainly in terms of operationalization and measurement. While 
parliaments can be classified according to their institutional strength in EU affairs, 
it is far more difficult to assign labels of ‘more’ or ‘less Europeanized’ on that 
basis. This is not only a question of institutional vs. behavioural Europeanization, 
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but also relates to the yardstick used to measure the extent of both passive and 
active Europeanization. If, as argued above, the institutional adaptation of national 
parliaments mirrors their strength in domestic affairs, then a weak parliament with 
weak institutional rights in EU affairs could be just as ‘Europeanized’ as a 
powerful parliament that has established tight scrutiny provisions. Alternatively, 
the standard could be based on a definition of the parliamentary functions that we 
expect parliaments to fulfil in EU affairs. The problem here is that different 
parliaments emphasize different functions, both in domestic and EU affairs, 
making comparative assessments difficult; in addition, scholars do not agree on 
what the functions of national parliaments actually are or ought to be in EU 
politics (Auel 2007). Raunio and Wiberg (2010: 76) define Europeanization more 
broadly as ‘the extent to which national parliaments have “re-oriented” their 
activities on account of European integration’, which includes the share of EU-
related laws and time spent on EU issues in committees, party group meetings and 
the plenary, but also the use of control instruments such as parliamentary 
questions and votes of no confidence. However, as the authors point out, 
European and domestic matters have become so intertwined that it is increasingly 
difficult even to define what actually constitutes a European issue.  
 
Closely related to these concerns is another potential pitfall of Europeanization 
research (Radaelli and Pasquier 2007) – namely, the danger of attributing too 
much to the EU and thus overestimating the impact of European integration on 
national parliaments. While it may be fairly easy to identify institutional scrutiny 
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arrangements or specific EU activities as a reaction to European integration (and 
thus as active Europeanization), isolating the impact of European integration on 
national parliaments in terms of parliamentary power or executive-legislative 
relations is far more problematic. Indeed, lamentations over ‘de-
parliamentarization’ often tend to be based on a somewhat idealized view of 
parliamentary power in domestic politics, as if there existed some sort of ‘golden 
age of parliamentarism’ before ‘the EU cast its long shadow over national 
politics’ (O’Brennan and Raunio 2007a: 8). However, in reality, most national 
parliaments in Europe were at best modest policy influencers to begin with, and 
European integration is just one among the many challenges that national 
parliaments must face, such as globalization and the growth of the regulatory state 
(see also chapter 18 in this volume).  
 
In fact, compared to developments in domestic politics, we can even observe a 
remarkable resilience among national parliaments in the European context. Power 
shifts in executive-legislative relations caused by European integration are 
primarily based on explicit institutional decisions (such as successive Treaty 
amendments), a process that – despite some delay – has induced national 
parliaments to respond more decisively. With the provisions enshrined in the 
Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments have even acquired participation rights in EU 
politics beyond the domestic sphere, although these are limited and collective in 
nature. Whether and to what extent the Eurozone crisis and the changes to 
economic governance in the EU will erode this progress in terms of parliamentary 
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legitimacy is difficult to predict. Processes of ‘passive Europeanization’ have 
certainly reached a new level: Crisis management ‘by summit’ has become the 
norm; intergovernmental treaties outside the EU legal framework have weakened 
parliamentary participation rights; and strict austerity measures, financial 
guarantees, closer economic policy coordination and enforced budgetary 
discipline have all impacted core areas of parliamentary authority. However, 
reforms are on-going, and there are already signs pointing towards greater 
parliamentary legitimacy at both the European and the domestic level.  
 
European integration and the associated challenges are thus no reason to write off 
national parliaments. Arguments about ‘de-parliamentarization’ tend to overlook 
the fact that national parliaments have become far more involved in EU politics 
over recent decades; in addition, their proponents often expect parliaments to be 
more assertive and more powerful policy influencers in EU affairs than they are in 
domestic decision-making processes. In turn, it must also not be overlooked that 
national parliaments differ with regard to their level of active Europeanization in 
terms of both, their institutional adaptation and strength and their level of activity. 
As a result, citizens of EU member states enjoy different levels of parliamentary 
representation when it comes to EU affairs. One of the main challenges for EU 
democracy, especially in the context of the current crisis and the emerging new 
system of economic governance, will be to avoid the exacerbation of existing 
power imbalances between national parliaments in EU affairs.  
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Table 21.1: Scrutiny provisions in national parliaments 
 
Member state Title of the 
committee/ 
composition 
Involvement 
of standing 
committees 
Scope of 
scrutiny/binding 
character/scrutiny 
reserve 
Austria 
Nationalrat  
Main Committee on 
EU Affairs, 26 
members 
 
Standing 
Subcommittee on EU 
Affairs, 16 members 
No systematic 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is formally 
binding, gov’t. has to 
re-negotiate 
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Belgium 
Chambre des 
représentants  
Federal Advisory 
Committee on 
European Affairs 
(joint committee with 
Sénat), 10 senators, 
10 members of the 
Chambre and 10 
Belgian MEPs 
Advisory 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents 
 
Position is non-binding 
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Bulgaria 
Narodno 
sabranie  
Committee on 
European Affairs and 
Oversight of the 
European Funds, 18 
members 
Advisory 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is non-binding 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Cyprus 
Vouli ton 
Antiprosopon  
Committee on 
European Affairs, 10 
members 
Advisory 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is non-binding 
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Czech 
Republic 
Poslanecká 
sněmovna  
Committee for 
European Affairs,  
15 members 
No systematic 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is non-binding 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Denmark 
Folketing  
European Affairs, 
29 members 
Advisory 
involvement 
Mainly gov’t. position 
 
Position is formally 
binding, gov’t. has to 
re-negotiate 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Estonia 
Riigikogu 
European Union 
Affairs Committee, 
at least 15 members 
Advisory 
involvement 
Both documents and 
gov’t. position 
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Parliamentary position 
is politically binding, 
gov’t. has to justify 
deviation 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Finland 
Eduskunta 
Grand Committee,  
25 titular members 
and 13 substitutes 
with right to attend 
and speak 
Full 
involvement 
Both documents and 
gov’t. position 
 
Parliamentary position 
is politically binding, 
gov’t. has to justify 
deviation  
 
Scrutiny reserve 
France 
Assemblée 
nationale  
Committee on 
European Affairs, 48 
members 
Full 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is non-binding 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Germany 
Bundestag 
 
Committee on the 
Affairs of the 
European Union, 33 
MPs and 16 German 
MEPs without voting 
rights 
Full 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is politically 
binding, gov’t. has to 
try to find consensus 
with BT and justify 
deviation 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Greece 
Vouli ton 
Ellinon  
Special Standing 
Committee for 
European Affairs,  
31 members 
Advisory 
involvement 
 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is non-binding 
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Hungary 
Országgyűlés  
Committee on 
European Affairs, 21 
members 
Advisory 
involvement 
 
Both documents and 
gov’t. position 
 
Parliamentary position 
is politically binding, 
gov’t. has to justify 
deviation  
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Ireland 
Houses of the 
Oireachtas  
Joint Committee on 
European Union 
Affairs, 9 members 
Full 
involvement 
since 2011 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is non-binding 
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of the Dáil Eireann, 
5 members of the 
Seanad Eireann 
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Italy 
Camera dei 
Deputati  
Committee on EU 
Policies, 43 members 
Full 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is politically 
binding, gov’t. has to 
justify deviation 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Latvia 
Saeima  
European Affairs 
Committee, 17 
members 
No systematic 
involvement 
Mainly gov’t. position 
 
Position is politically 
binding, gov’t. has to 
justify deviation 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Lithuania 
Seimas  
Committee on 
European Affairs, not 
less than 15 and not 
more than 25 
members; currently 
21 members  
Advisory 
involvement 
Both documents and 
gov’t. position 
 
Position is politically 
binding, gov’t. has to 
justify deviation 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Luxembourg 
Chambre des 
Députés  
Committee for 
Foreign and 
European Affairs, for 
Defence, for 
Cooperation and for 
Immigration,  
12 members 
Full 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is politically 
binding, gov’t. has to 
justify deviation 
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Malta 
Kamra tad- 
Deputati  
Standing Committee 
on Foreign and 
European Affairs, 9 
members 
No systematic 
involvement 
Mainly gov’t. position 
 
Position is non-binding 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Netherlands 
Tweede Kamer  
Committee on 
European Affairs, 24 
members 
Full 
involvement 
Both documents and 
gov’t. position 
 
Formally, position is 
non-binding, but gov’t. 
will usually justify 
deviation 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
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Poland 
Sejm  
European Union 
Affairs Committee, 
not less than 15 and 
not more than 46 
members (10% of the 
Sejm); currently 44 
members 
No systematic 
involvement 
Both documents and 
gov’t. position 
 
Position is politically 
binding, gov’t. has to 
justify deviation 
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Portugal 
Assembleia da 
República  
Committee on 
European Affairs, 21 
members 
Advisory 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is non-binding 
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Romania 
Camera 
Deputaţilor  
Committee on 
European Affairs, 25 
members 
Full 
involvement 
Mainly gov’t. positions 
 
Position is non-binding 
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Slovakia 
Národná rada  
Committee on 
European Affairs, 11 
members 
Advisory 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is politically 
binding, gov’t. has to 
justify deviation  
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Slovenia 
Državni zbor  
Committee for EU 
Affairs, 14 members 
Advisory 
involvement 
Mainly gov’t. position 
 
Position is politically 
binding, gov’t. has to 
justify deviation 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Spain Cortes 
Generales  
Joint Committee for 
the European Union, 
43 members 
Advisory 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is non-binding 
 
No scrutiny reserve 
Sweden 
Riksdag  
Committee on EU 
Affairs, 17 members 
and 42 alternates 
Full 
involvement 
Both documents and 
gov’t. position 
 
Parliamentary position 
is politically binding, 
gov’t. has to justify 
deviation 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
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United 
Kingdom 
House of 
Commons  
European Scrutiny 
Committee, 16 
members 
 
European 
Committees, 13 
members (ad-hoc 
membership) 
No systematic 
involvement 
Mainly EU documents  
 
Position is non-binding 
 
Scrutiny reserve 
Sources: Hefftler et al. 2014 and COSAC 2013 
 
 
 
 
Table 21.2: Institutional Europeanization: Ranking national parliaments 
according to their institutional strength in EU affairs 
 
Member State Rank Order  Karlas 2012 
Rank Order 
Winzen 2012 
Rank Order  
Auel et al. 2013 
Estonia 1 4 4 
Finland 1 2 1 
Lithuania 1 2 3 
Denmark 2 1 3 
Poland 3 5 8 
Slovenia 3 5 5 
Sweden 3 6 3 
Germany 4 4 2 
Hungary 4 5 8 
Austria 5 6 7 
Latvia 5 5 7 
Netherlands 5 6 4 
Slovakia 5 2 7 
Romania 6 3 10 
France 7 9 6 
Italy 8 7 8 
Bulgaria 9 5 9 
Czech Rep. 9 6 6 
UK 10 7 7 
Luxembourg 10 11 9 
Malta 11 8 8 
Belgium 12 11 12 
Cyprus 12 12 11 
Greece 12 10 12 
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Ireland 12 8 9 
Portugal 12 8 9 
Spain 12 10 9 
Parliaments (lower chambers only) were ranked on a scale from 1 (strongest) to 12 (weakest) 
using the ranking in Karlas (2012) and the scores in Winzen (2012) and Auel et al. (2014).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
ENDNOTES  
 
1  Due to space limitations, this article cannot present a comprehensive overview of the 
literature, but Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2008), Raunio (2009) and Winzen (2010) provide 
excellent reviews.  
2  A comprehensive overview of the scrutiny provisions in all national parliaments can be 
found in Hefftler et al. (2014).  
3  In contrast, Finland often has oversized coalition governments.  
4  The following focuses mainly on the role of national parliaments as guardians of the 
subsidiarity principle. The Treaty, however, also empowers national parliaments in other ways. 
For an exhaustive list, see Kiiver (2012).  
5  12 parliaments with 19 votes overall submitted a reasoned opinion on the ‘Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services’(Monti II) (COM/2012/0130). On 
the proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's 
Office (COM(2013) 534), the Commission received reasoned opinions from 11 parliaments 
representing 19 votes.   
6  See European Commission (2013a).  
7 See the Commission’s report on ‘Subsidiarity and Proportionality – Better Lawmaking’ 
(European Commission 2013b) and the annual report on ‘Relations Between the European 
Commission and National Parliaments’(European Commission 2013c). 
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8  Parliamentary opinions and replies from the Commission can be found online at 
European Commission (2013c). 
9 On the following see also Auel and Höing 2013. 
10  Since 2008, EU member states, in particular those within the Eurozone, have experienced 
a succession of crises; this started with the banking crisis following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and has culminated in the current ‘Euro crisis’. 
11   The ‘six pack’ is a set of five regulations and one directive aimed at tightening the 
Stability and Growth Pact and addressing macro-economic imbalances. The ‘European Semester’ 
provides a framework to improve economic policy coordination in the EU. 
12  The amendment to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) paved the way for the establishment of the ESM by the Eurozone members.  
